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The Premisses and the
It is of course essential, for such an explanation, that the cause be the cause of a single condition. Otherwise the same cause could produce different effects. Plato secures this by requiring that each Form be a single character or kind (monoeides, Phaedo 78d5), and hence, that each Form be the cause of a single condition. Thus, if different things participate in the same Form, they acquire the same condition. The qualitative and numerical oneness of the cause, then, is secured for the explanation of the similarity of its effects.' 'Further, in the text of the first TMA (Parmenides 132a1-b2) Plato says that entities that participate in the Form of Largeness 'will all be [estail large' ( 132b I). In the second TMA (132c12-133a7), he says that by participation in the Form, things will be like (132e3, 133a 1).
The translations of the Parmenides texts are from Allen (1983), unless otherwise specified. 6 Ultimately.Plato realises that even the numerical and qualitative oneness of the cause is not sufficient for the qualitative identity of the effects, because of the mediation of multiple relations of participation between the f things and the Form. Namely, if .: is
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My concern in the analysis of the TMA is to show that the problem it encounters is deeply rooted in its premisses. The problem underlies the controversy of whether there is a single Form F per character, or many. That is, even if we assume that there are many Forms F per character, thus avoiding the contradiction Vlastos pointed to,' even then, the Theory cannot be salvaged; the premisses of the TMA are committed to a necessary falsehood -making them false in all possible worlds. So, although I agree with Vlastos's textual evidence that the TMA assumes there is only one Form F per character,8 I will here follow Sellars,' Geach,"' and Cohen," in allowing for many Forms F per character. My aim is to show that, even when Vlastos' contradiction is avoided, it nevertheless remains the case that the premisses entail a necessary falsehood.
Let us now turn to the specification of the premisses of the TMA. (I shall use the term 'entity' to refer to both, things in the empirical world and Forms.) It is clear that no assumption has been made about the uniqueness of Form F. That is, the premisses allow that there be many Forms F per character, e.g. many Forms of Justice or Largeness, just as Sellars required in order to avoid the inconsistency in Vlastos' premisses. (PP), the Predication Premiss, establishes the causal efficacy of a Form F. Plato makes this explicit when he states that Form F 'makes' an entityf, that an entity 'becomes'f by participating in a Form F, and that an entity 'is' f by participation in Form F.'2 related by P, to Form F, while y by P, etc., for the effects on x and y to be similar, P, and P. must be similar. But this is a problem that Plato tackles in the Dilemma of Participation, which I analyse in Scaltsas (1989, pp. 67-90 " When 01 is put to work in the generation of the regress, it will not apply to all f entities in the universe. I intend the grouping together off entities at each step of the Third Man regress to be understood in terms of S. Marc Cohen's notion of a maximal set, in Cohen (1971, pp. 461-464) . See the analysis of the regress below. '" The text does not force us to take this position. What the text does is to introduce a second type of causal agency in the argument, which any interpretation must explain. Namely, despite the fact that object x is large by participation in the Form of Large.,,, Plato says that in the nth step, x is large by participation in the Form of Large, ('by which they will all be large', 'J' TcLi,ua t4EvTa REy64a E'rCtL', 132bl, my emphasis). Why does Plato require all the objects in each step (rather than just the penultimate Form) to participate in the highest Form? If the result of participation was just to make each of them f, he would be committing the system to overdetermination of causes for no reason at all; x would be f by participating in F,. and again by participating in Fn, etc. My suggestion above is that Plato requires it because something different is achieved by participation in the same Form, over and above each participant's becoming f by participating in a Form F. Namely, by participating in the same Form F, each participant becomes qualitatively identical to its co-participants in the same Form. This is explicitly stated in the second version of the TMA, at 132d9-el.
qualitatively identical with respect to their causal powers, in order to explain why the entities that participate in them become qualitatively identical between themselves. If he did not address this question, his Theory would provide no account of the similarity between f things. But giving a non-vacuous answer to the qualitative identity question is an essential goal of the Theory of Forms, for which purpose 01 is imported.
Plato is yet more explicit about QO in his second version of the TMA: 'And must not the thing which is like share with the thing that is like it in one and the same character?'15 Premiss (SP) is Vlastos' Self-Predication premiss (as amended by Sellars to allow for many Forms F) securing that each Form F is itself f. That the cause possesses the condition it produces in a thing was a fundamental belief in Greek thought that finds explicit expression in Aristotle: 'that which produces the form possesses it.'6 Further, Jonathan Barnes gives reasons for tracing to the Presocratics the general principle: 'If something F comes into being from a, then a is F.'7 Given the wide acceptance this claim enjoyed, it is no wonder that Plato would not consider Self-Predication a negotiable premiss.
Finally, (NI) is Vlastos' amended Non-Identity premiss, securing that the cause off-ness is different from the entity that acquiresf-ness. We can find justification for the Non-Identity thesis in Aristotle's system, in which, as in Plato's Theory, the generation of things requires the existence of forms. Form is not generated, according to Aristotle. 8 If it were, the generation of anything would require an infinite regress of generations.'9 So, if not generated, form must be passed down from cause to product. Hence, the cause must be different from the product (NI), and must possess the form it passes down to the product (SP).
The regress is generated from the premisses as follows. There are, for example, hot things in the world. Each of them is hot by participating in a In the TMA, the discrepancy arises from the fact that the Theory of Forms places different requirements for 'making somethingf (PP) and for 'making it f-identical' to an f thing (01). But this cannot be: making somethingf must be all that is required for making itf-identical to anf thing.
It is true that a does not participate only in F1; it participates in all the Forms F of the generated regress. Therefore, a is f-identical to Form F1, since both a and F1 participate in F2. But this does not remove the discrepancy. The question is not whether a isf-identical to Form F, or not; that it is. Rather, the question is whether the condition that makes a fparticipation in F1 -is sufficient to make a f-identical to an f entity -Form F,. What is sufficient for making somethingf must be sufficient for making it f-identical to an f entity. But according to the Theory of Forms it is not, since participation in Form F1 makes a f, but not f-identical to Form F1, which is f.21
This failure cannot be overcome by the Theory, whether there is just one, or finitely many, or infinitely many, Forms F per character. It will always be the case that Form F makes a thingf, but does not make itf-identical to the Form itself, which is f. So, regardless of how many Forms F there are, the Theory is committed to the absurdity that participation in any Form F makes the things f, without making them f-identical to an f entity -that Form.22 2' The falsehood is generated from the incompatibility between Q0 and PP. But even if we exclude PP from the premisses, the remaining premisses are still necessarily false, because PP reappears. The reason is that the condition that is sufficient for making two things f-identical to one another should be sufficient for making them f-identical to anything else to which they are f-identical. So participation in Form F, which makes a and bf-identical, should be sufficient to make them f-identical to F, (which is f-identical to them, by the SP of that version); but it is not sufficient, according to the Theory, since it is their common participation in F, that achieves that. Hence, the absurdity. The reason why the discrepancy persists even without PP is that the premisses allow us to talk of what makes a thing f-identical to another, which is nothing other than talking of that thing's being f. Hence, we have not really abandoned PP from the premisses, nor treated qualitative identity as an unanalysable primitive. Rather, PP has re-appeared in 01, which claims that there is a condition a thing must satisfy to become f-identical to another, namely participation in Form F, which is what possessing f-ness is. 22 S. Marc Cohen does not include QI and PP in his premisses. It should therefore come as no surprise that in his version, the premisses of the TMA turn out to be 'a consistent premise set' (Cohen (1971, p. 456) ). Cohen's interpretation does not take into account the causal efficacy of participation in Forms. As we have seen (Section 1, especially note 14), Plato insists on two, causally different, conditions: participating in a Form F, and participating in the same Form F; the first is associated with beingf, while the second with
The Interpretation
We have now identified the premisses of the TMA. How are we to understand them? Some of the premisses of the TMA are at first glance implausible, which raises the question of why Plato felt committed to them. For example, the Self-Predication premiss, which is very bizarre if we give the Forms an epistemological interpretation, as is often done. The concept of Largeness is not large, so it is difficult to see why Plato or anyone else would ever assume that. Similarly, we are not helped in understanding SP by thinking of the Forms set-theoretically; the set of green things is not green. To understand why Plato is committed to the premisses of the TMA we need to understand the type of explanation that he is offering through the Theory of Forms.
One of the most ancient models of explanation is explanation by origin. (Barnes (1979, vol. 1, p. 88) ): "'Causation is by synonyms" . . . the principle is supported by numerous examples; and it helps to explain the occult property of causality: causes produce changes in the objects they effect by transferring or imparting something to those objects; when the fire makes me warm, it bestows heat upon me'.2 The restriction introduced by the synonymy principle is the beingf-identical to anotherf thing. In Cohen's version, the One-over-Many premiss is the following: 'For any maximal set there is exactly one Form in which all and only members of that set participate' (Cohen (1971, p. 462) ). This premiss fails to connect participation in a Form to either beingf, or to being f-identical to other things. The premiss provides only an existential principle generating Forms. But the premiss does not specify what, according to the Theory, is achieved by participation in a Form. More importantly it does not explain why it is that Plato requires that at each step, it is the last Form in that step 'by which they [i.e. the large things and Forms participating in it] will all be large' (4 Taviar   JTavTa requirement of similarity between the nature of the producer and the nature of the product. A particular strand of explanation by 'synonymous origin' is the explanation of a phenomenon by the inheritance of characteristics. On this biological model of explanation, the presence of a feature is explained by identifying the parents as the source from which the feature was inherited; thus Aristotle: 'the producer is of the same kind as the produced . . . (for man produces man)' (Metaphysics 1033b30-32) .25
According to it, the presence of a feature is explained by identifying the producer or creator.23 Thus, an artifact is beautiful because Hephaestus or Pheidias made it, and Pharaohs have superlative wisdom because of their divine origin. A restriction on the generality of explanation by origin is imported by what Barnes has described as the Synonymy Principle, which he considers to have a Presocratic origin
The biological model of explanation is characterised by the following four features. First, explanation of the presence of a feature in the offspring consists in tracing the feature in question to the source, the parents. Otherwise, no explanation has been given, since nothing inherits a feature from itself. Second, the source from which the feature has been inherited must itself possess that feature. If the parents do not possess the feature, they cannot pass it on to the offspring. Third, the relation of offspring to parents is such that the feature of the parents can be passed on to the offspring that inherits it. Fourth, similarity between offspring is explained in terms of their family-relation: they are similar because they inherit the characteristic from the same parents. In conclusion, then, Plato assumed a unique Form F per character, and was forced by the TMA to conclude that there are many Forms F per character. He could have avoided the contradiction by allowing an (Associative) multiplicity of Forms F per character, while hailing the TMA as their discovery! That he did not do so indicates that he had an immediate apprehension of the threat that such a multiplicity of sources off-ness posed for the Theory of Forms. We have no evidence that Plato saw the threat clearly for what it is, namely, as the absurd division of semantic labour between f-predication and f-identity. But he could see that having many sources off-ness is having no source off-ness. Hence, multiplicity of Forms F per character was seen as fatal to the Theory, and hence, the TMA (which shows that even when he assumes a unique Form F, to explain why things aref, infinitely many Forms F need to be imported to do the job) was seen as a criticism of the Theory rather than the salvation of it.
Conclusion
My concern in this paper has been, first, to offer a logical analysis of the Third Man Argument, by identifying the premisses and examining their truth. Second, to provide an interpretation of the Forms and the participation relation, which would help us understand why Plato committed himself to these premisses. The pursuit of the logic of the argument resulted in the identification of two distinct premisses, one explaining why things aref, and the other, why things are similar with respect to f-ness. This revealed a discrepancy between the two premisses: satisfying the condition for beingf is not sufficient for being qualitatively identical to an f entity -which is absurd. This absurdity is derived on the minimal set of premisses required for the TMA regress, which does not include the premiss in Vlastos' analysis, that there is a unique Form F per character.
The interpretation involved understanding a Form as a source of f-ness, and participation in a Form as the acquisition of thef-ness of the Form. The interpretation allows us to understand how Plato used the Theory to answer both the predication and the qualitative identity questions. First, a thing isf by acquiring its f-ness from the source, and second, it is similar to other f things by sharing with them one and the same source of their condition. But herein lies the problem: the first claims that a thing acquires the condition of membership in that set cannot be whatf entities share in common. So membership in the set fails to qualify its members asf-identical to thef entities which are excluded from that set. But failing to qualify them as beingf-identical tof entities is failing to qualify them as being f. 230 the source (thereby becoming similar to it) by participating in it; the second claims that the thing becomes similar to the source (not by participating in it, but) only by participating along with the source in a further source. Hence the absurdity.
The conclusion of the above analysis is that the Theory of Forms is an impossible explanatory model of why things aref. It requires participation in a Form F to pass on the Form's condition to the participating thing; but it denies that participation in that Form is what makes the thing similar to that Form.37 Hence, the Theory makes impossible demands on the participation relation.
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